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“‘If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.’ Unless
you’re losing your children, or your home, or your healthcare . . . .”
– National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a
peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the
Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as
inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal
level of free inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as
divested of two fifths of the MAN. 2
James Madison wrote The Federalist No. 54 defending the
infamous three-fifths compromise, which allowed White southern
slaveowners to aggregate political power on the backs of their Black slaves,
without representing their interests in any substantive way. 3
Prison gerrymandering—using prison populations as part of the
underlying population for redistricting—is a modern manifestation of the
same concept. Prisons, and the people who are currently incarcerated
within, are uniquely productive in many aspects of society. 4 Prisoners may

ǂ Adam
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especially like to thank the staff members and editorial team of the Mitchell Hamline Law
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encouragement to keep digging.
NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., http://civilrighttocounsel.org/
[https://perma.cc/RR2B-FADJ].
THE FEDERALIST NO. 54 (James Madison) (The Avalon Project,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed54.asp
[https://perma.cc/5VDM-M5U5]).
While there is some debate over whether this was written by Hamilton or Madison, most say
Madison is the author. Joerg Knipprath, Federalist No. 54 – The Apportionment of
Members Among the States, From the New York Packet (Madison or Hamilton),
CONSTITUTING AM. (July 12, 2010), https://constitutingamerica.org/july-12-–-federalist-no54-–-the-apportionment-of-members-among-the-states-from-the-new-york-packet-madisonor-hamilton-–-guest-blogger-joerg-knipprath-professor-of-law-a/
[https://perma.cc/5H2MABV7].
THE FEDERALIST NO. 54 (James Madison) (The Avalon Project,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed54.asp [https://per cma.cc/5VDM-M5U5]).
See, e.g., Michael Skocpol, The Emerging Constitutional Law of Prison Gerrymandering,
69 STAN. L. REV. 1473 (2017) (discussing prison gerrymandering broadly); Faith
Stachulski, Prison Gerrymandering: Locking Up Elections and Diluting Representational
Equality, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 401, 407 (2019) (examining court decisions related to prison
gerrymandering).
1
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be paid a lower wage than a similarly employed individual outside of prison. 5
They are almost never allowed to vote. 6 Federally, slavery itself is not
prohibited for incarcerated individuals. 7 Prison gerrymandering similarly coopts prisoners as a resource to be used for another party’s benefit. 8
This concept is particularly harmful to minority populations when
amplified by a dramatic rise in incarceration rates generally, exemplified in
both racial disparities in incarceration rates and racial segregation. 9 Due to
a confluence of extreme racial disparities in incarceration rates and a wellearned reputation of racial segregation, Wisconsin provides a dramatic
example of this problem. 10
Wisconsin, like many states, has historically counted prisoners for
redistricting purposes at their location of incarceration instead of the
community that they originated in. This practice continues to be justified
based on an incorrect interpretation of the state’s constitution, which likely
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. To avoid
perpetuating this flawed method, the state should change how it interprets
“inhabitants” for the purpose of redistricting before the 2021 redistricting
cycle. Following the Supreme Court’s rejection of federal court review for
political gerrymandering issues, 11 prison gerrymandering will be a heavily
litigated area of law at the state level, particularly in states like Wisconsin,
where the impact is drastic.
Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE: PUBL’NS (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/
[https://perma.cc/7YTF-PWU3].
Only Maine and Vermont permit some convicted felons to vote from prison. ME. STAT.
tit. 21-A, § 112(14) (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2122(a) (2016); Vermont residents
imprisoned outside of the state may vote absentee. Jane Timm, Most States Disenfranchise
Felons. Maine and Vermont Allow Inmates to Vote from Prison., NBC NEWS (Feb. 26,
2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/states-rethink-prisoner-voting-rightsincarceration-rates-rise-n850406 [https://perma.cc/SR3B-R9LV].
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
The
Problem,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/impact.html
[https://perma.cc/LT4W-5CL2]
(“Because prisons are disproportionately built in rural areas but most incarcerated people
call urban areas home, counting prisoners in the wrong place results in a systematic transfer
of population and political clout from urban to rural areas.”).
See Michael Skocpol, The Emerging Constitutional Law of Prison Gerrymandering, 69
STAN. L. REV. 1473, 1486 (2017); Brianna Remster & Rory Kramer, Shifting Power: The
Impact of Incarceration on Political Representation, 15 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RSCH. ON
RACE 417, 418 (2018) (“Until the 1980s there were so few prisoners that this policy likely
had little impact.”).
Wisconsin,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/wisconsin.html [https://perma.cc/QJQ8-NFGS].
See generally Whitford v. Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
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This Note has six parts. Part II describes the concept of prison
gerrymandering. Part III distinguishes incarcerated individuals from other
analogous populations. Part IV describes prison gerrymandering in
Wisconsin, specifically. Part V explains how Wisconsin’s interpretation of
“inhabitants” is inconsistent and erroneous. Part VI suggests that litigation
based on the Equal Protection Clause might be the best avenue to sue a
state based on prison-oriented gerrymandering. Finally, Part VII suggests
two options for Wisconsin to resolve this issue for the 2021 redistricting
plan: legislative action to prohibit prison gerrymandering or executive action
by the governor to veto any redistricting plans that uses prison populations
to inflate districts.
II.

THE CENSUS, STATE REDISTRICTING PRACTICES & HISTORY
OF PRISON GERRYMANDERING

Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution requires an
“actual enumeration” of persons within the several states to be conducted
every ten years in a manner specified by Congress. 12 Congress has specified
several mechanisms to perform the “actual enumeration” since 1790. 13
Currently, the process is known as the U.S. Census (Census) and is
administered by the U.S. Census Bureau (Census Bureau), which conducts
a decennial enumeration as required by the Constitution along with
supplemental surveys to gather more detailed statistical information during
the interim periods. 14 This part has five sections. The first will briefly
examine state redistricting processes generally. The second covers
Wisconsin’s redistricting process specifically. The third section highlights
how the federal courts examine districts with unequal population
distributions. The fourth section provides an overview of prison
gerrymandering generally, and the final section briefly reviews the current
federal precedent for prison gerrymandering cases.

A.

State Redistricting Processes

States are given great discretion in determining how to reapportion
their legislative and congressional districts. 15 Generally, “[u]nless a choice is
one the Constitution forbids, the resulting apportionment base offends no

12

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.

See
generally
Through
the
Decades,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/
[https://perma.cc/8H6HMLCM].
13

14
15

Id.
See generally Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016).
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constitutional bar . . . .” 16 In the 1960s, the Supreme Court established in
Baker v. Carr that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires legislative districts to be roughly equal in population. 17
Subsequently, the Court in Reynolds v. Sims required states to equalize
population in legislative districts “as nearly as is practicable.” 18 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Reynolds established the principle of “one person, one
vote” to guide states in determining valid redistricting schemes. 19
Every state uses the national Census in some capacity for their
redistricting process, although “[s]tates are [not] required to include aliens,
transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for
conviction of crime in the apportionment base by which their legislators are
distributed.” 20 Seven states (Washington, California, Nevada, Maryland,
Delaware, New York, and New Jersey) have prohibited the practice of using
prison populations when redistricting. 21 Several others, including
Tennessee, Colorado, Michigan, Virginia, and Massachusetts, have enacted
some measure of limiting the impact of prison populations on redistricting. 22
In Wisconsin, lack of political will stifled the efforts to prohibit this practice
within the legislature during the 2009 and 2011 sessions. 23
Outside of the few states that recently adopted changes related to
counting prisoners in upcoming redistricting cycles, states have largely
remained stagnant on the issue. 24 “Legislative inaction, coupled with the
unavailability of any political or judicial remedy, had resulted, with the
passage of years, in the perpetuated scheme becoming little more than an
irrational anachronism.” 25
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966). A full discussion of the Court’s evolving
jurisprudence on redistricting generally is outside the scope of this Note. For a more
thorough discussion, see Thomas L. Brunell, The One Person, One Vote Standard in
Redistricting: The Uses and Abuses of Population Deviations in Legislative Redistricting,
62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1057 (2012).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
Id. at 570.
Burns, 384 U.S. at 92.
See Ludwig Hurtado, States Move to Outlaw ‘Prison Gerrymandering’: Where Do Inmates
Really Live?, NBC NEWS (May 23, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politicsnews/will-prison-gerrymandering-be-next-big-fight-n999656 [https://perma.cc/P66E-CK5K];
Brent Johnson, N.J. Will Soon Allow You to Register to Vote Online, NJ.COM (Jan. 21,
2020),
https://www.nj.com/politics/2020/01/nj-will-soon-allow-you-to-register-to-voteonline.html [https://perma.cc/84L9-7N8B].
Hurtado, supra note 20; Johnson, supra note 20.
See Assemb. J. Res. 63, 2009–10 Assemb. (Wis. 2009); Assemb. J. Res. 122, 2011–12
Assemb. (Wis. 2011).
Hurtado, supra note 21 (outlining the changes that seven states, including New York and
California, will make to their redistricting process following the 2020 census).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 570 (1964).
16

17
18
19
20
21

22
23

24
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Redistricting in Wisconsin
Wisconsin’s redistricting process has been consistent in the post-

Reynolds era. District lines are reevaluated and adjusted every ten years to
26

reflect population changes by balancing principles of equal population,
compactness, contiguity, shared communities of interest, unity of political
subdivisions, and minority protection. 27 The process is simple: the
legislature makes the maps, and the governor signs them into law. 28
Wisconsin’s process is entirely political, originating with the elected
legislature, then culminating with the governor’s approval or veto. 29 This
process is the most common approach to redistricting in the United States. 30
Prior to the 1960s, Wisconsin’s redistricting process created districts with
dramatic differences in population, despite state constitutional requirements
for districts to be equally-populated. 31 In the years since, consistent with
guidance from the Supreme Court, Wisconsin’s redistricting efforts have
largely played out in the court system as political parties sought to challenge
individual districts. 32

C.

Unequal Redistricting

Though the courts have generally allowed states discretion in
determining their redistricting process, there is some recent guidance on
how those processes may be challenged. In Harris v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission, voters in Arizona challenged the state’s
redistricting plans following the 2010 redistricting cycle. 33 In 2000, Arizona
See generally Michael Keane, Redistricting in Wisconsin, WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE
BUREAU,
(2016),
https://www.wisdc.org/images/files/pdf_imported/redistricting/redistricting_april2016_leg_r
ef_bureau.pdf [https://perma.cc/G47R-9DYQ].
Id. at 1–5.
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
See, e.g., The “Iowa Model” for Redistricting, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr.
6, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/the-iowa-model-for-redistricting.aspx
[https://perma.cc/F6GB-TPLN].
Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?, LOYOLA L. SCH.: ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING,
http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php [https://perma.cc/7WVR-NE9U] (providing an overview
of the different methods of redistricting across the United States).
Keane, supra note 25, at 6.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 23 Wis. 2d 606 (1964); Wisconsin AFLCIO v. Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 2d 630 (1982); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp.
859 (1992); Baumgart v. Wendelberger, No. 01-C-0121, 2002 WL 34127471 (E.D. Wis.
May 30, 2002). For a thorough discussion of Wisconsin’s contentious history of redistricting,
see KEANE, WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, REDISTRICTING IN WISCONSIN (2016),
https://www.wisdc.org/images/files/pdf_imported/redistricting/redistricting_april2016_leg_r
ef_bureau.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7TM-AURF].
Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1306 (2016).
26

27
28
29

30

31
32

33
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adopted an independent redistricting commission to draw its maps, using
this same commission in 2010. 34 The developed maps, after attempting to
compensate for Voting Rights Act concerns, created districts with a total
population deviation of 8.8%. 35 That is, the largest districts deviated from
the average by a maximum of that amount. The Harris Court declined to
reject Arizona’s maps. Instead, it required that any challenge to a stateapproved plan must show that it is “more probable than not that a
population deviation [from absolute equality of districts] of less than 10
percent reflects the predominance of illegitimate reapportionment factors
rather than the legitimate considerations.” 36 This means that if the total
population difference between districts is less than ten percent, any
challenge must show that it was predominantly based on illegitimate
factors. 37 While the Court did not enumerate an exhaustive list of illegitimate
factors, it specified that legitimate factors for redistricting could include
traditional concerns such as compactness, contiguity, and the integrity of
political subdivisions. 38 As a result, the challenge failed, and Arizona’s maps
were upheld. 39

D. Political Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering is a practice as old as our country itself. In 1789,
Thomas Jefferson wrote, “[Virginia Governor Patrick] Henry has so
modelled the districts for representatives as to tack Orange [County] to
counties where he himself has great influence that [John] Madison may not
be elected into the lower federal house.” 40 Despite some efforts to wrangle
the gerrymander, the Supreme Court has limited its own role in dictating
how Congressional representational maps are created to cases involving
population disparities or race. 41
Most recently, in Rucho v. Common Cause, the Court held that
political gerrymandering was a nonjusticiable issue for the federal courts so
34
35
36

Id.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1307. The Court also noted that the Voting Rights Act sections that prompted

Arizona to create districts with 8.8% total population variance were held unconstitutional by

Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). Harris, 136 S. Ct. at 1307. The Court
declined to reject Arizona’s maps on this ground as Arizona developed the maps in 2010,
prior to the Shelby County decision. Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1306–07.

37
38
39

Id.

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019) (quoting 5 Writings of Thomas
Jefferson 71 (P. Ford ed. 1895) (Letter to W. Short (Feb. 9, 1789)).
See id. at 2495–97 (highlighting actions Congress took throughout the 1800s and 1900s to
limit the impact of gerrymandering, the efforts by the Court in Baker v. Carr, and the racial
discrimination line of cases to eliminate these types of gerrymanders).
40

41
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long as the jurisdiction did not depart from the traditional “one person, one
vote” standards and otherwise engage in unlawful discrimination. 42 In
Rucho, a consolidation of separate cases, voters in Maryland and North
Carolina challenged their states’ redistricting maps as unconstitutional
gerrymanders based on partisanship. 43 The Maryland plaintiffs complained
that their state maps favored Democrats by an unfair margin, and the North
Carolina plaintiffs complained that their state maps favored Republicans. 44
Specifically, voters challenged the maps on the basis of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming the maps unfairly diluted
their votes. 45 The Court declined to extend the Equal Protection Clause to
partisan gerrymandering on the basis that partisan gerrymanders “rest on an
instinct that groups with a certain level of political support should enjoy a
commensurate level of political power and influence.” 46 The Court
continued to explain that partisan gerrymandering claims “invariably sound
in a desire for proportional representation,” which the Equal Protection
Clause does not require. 47 Eventually, all of the partisan gerrymandering
claims were held to be “beyond the reach of the federal courts.” 48
However, prison gerrymandering is not as neat an issue, particularly
with disproportionate rates of incarceration. Black individuals make up
twelve percent of the national population, but thirty-three percent of the
prison population nationwide is Black. 49 Hispanic individuals are sixteen
percent of the national population and twenty-three percent of the prison
population. 50 This disparity may be sufficient to constitute an impermissible
racial gerrymander.

E.

Prison Gerrymandering in the Federal Courts

The federal courts have considered several cases in recent years;
however, there is no consensus.

42
43
44
45

See id. at 2501–02.
Id. at 2491.
See id.
Id. Plaintiffs from North Carolina also put forward claims based on the First Amendment,

the Elections Clause, and violations of Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution.
Maryland plaintiffs primarily put forward First Amendment claims. Id. The Fourteenth
Amendment argument is most directly relevant to prison gerrymandering.
Id. at 2486.
Id. (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75–76, (1980)).
Id. at 2506–07.
John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison Is
Shrinking, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/04/30/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whites-in-prison/
[https://perma.cc/74CF-QHMP].
46
47
48
49

50

Id.
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The Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of Commissioners
Decision

In Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of Commissioners, a rural
county was determined to have violated the Equal Protection Clause due to
prison gerrymandering. 51 Jefferson County, Florida, is governed by a fiveperson Board of Commissioners elected from districts of roughly equal
population. However, one district included the Jefferson Correctional
Institute (JCI), which housed over 1,100 incarcerated individuals. 52 These
districts were created by the Board of Commissioners pursuant to Florida
state law, dividing the territory “into districts of contiguous territory as nearly
equal in population as practicable.” 53 Throughout the redistricting process,
the Board sought advice on how to accommodate JCI’s large prison
population. It ultimately decided to try equalizing the total population
without regard to how many prisoners were in any single district. 54 For one
district, the subsequent maps produced its total population to be roughly
equal to the others, but it contained nearly thirty percent fewer individuals
when the JCI population was not included. 55 Calvin was brought by voters
in a district neighboring the one containing the JCI population, claiming that
including so many prisoners in one district unfairly inflated its residents’
voting power, violating the claimants’ rights under the “one person, one
vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause. 56
To answer this question, the court deconstructed the “one person,
one vote” concept and how individuals interacted with each other, the
community, and their representatives. 57 It then clarified when states have the
flexibility in determining which populations ought to be equalized when
drawing districts. 58
The court ultimately broke down existing Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence into the dueling concepts of representational equality and
electoral equality. 59 While the Calvin Court was unable to state an affirmative
bright-line rule, it did clarify that existing jurisprudence did not permit

51
52
53

Calvin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1295 (N.D. Fla. 2016).

Id. at 1295–96.
Id. at 1296; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (“After each decennial census the board of county

commissioners shall divide the county into districts of contiguous territory as nearly equal in
population as practicable.”).
Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1297.

54
55
56
57
58
59

Id.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1303–11.
See id. at 1312–14.
Id.
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redistricting plans that violate both representational and electoral equality. 60
Put succinctly,
An apportionment base for a given legislative body cannot
be chosen so that a large number of nonvoters who also
lack a meaningful representational nexus with that body are
packed into a small subset of legislative districts. Doing so
impermissibly dilutes the voting and representational
strength of denizens in other districts and violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 61
Accordingly, the court rejected the district lines, finding them
unconstitutional, as the “true denizen” population of the district containing
the prison was two-thirds the population of other districts which is far greater
than the ten percent threshold identified in Harris. 62

2.

The Evenwel v. Abbott Decision

The Supreme Court again addressed how populations should be
counted for redistricting purposes in Evenwel v. Abbott. 63 During 2010
redistricting, Texas drew its legislative districts based on a roughly equalized
total population, without consideration for the equalization of the eligible
voter population. 64 Like Arizona in Harris, Texas was subject to sections of
the Voting Rights Act requiring federal approval before implementing
voting changes. 65 Texas’s eventual maps were based on equalizing the total
population of each district, and it achieved that goal with a Harris-approved
population deviation of an average 8.04%. 66 However, when measured by
eligible voter population, the maximum deviation exceeded forty percent. 67
In Evenwel, the plaintiffs—residents of districts with particularly large eligible
voter populations relative to the total population—sued the state of Texas
for creating districts in violation of the Equal Protections Clause. 68
The Court analyzed the constitutional history of how congressional
districts ought to be apportioned, and determined that the original intent
was for reapportionment to be based on total population without regard for
Id.
Id. at 1315 (internal footnote omitted).
Id. at 1323–24. However, the court did caution that the result may have come out
differently had Calvin concerned a state redistricting plan since the “representational nexus”
analysis would change. Id. at 1324.
60
61
62

Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1306 (2016); Evenwel, 136
S. Ct. at 1125.
Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1125.

63
64

65
66
67
68

Id.
Id.
Id.
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voter eligibility, citing the three-fifths compromise as evidence. 69 This
original constitutional position was revisited following the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent debates over voter-based
apportionment, which ultimately resulted in retaining the total voter basis
for apportionment. 70 The Court declined to read a requirement for equal
districts based on total voting population instead of total population into the
Equal Protection Clause. 71
Nonvoters have an important stake in many policy
debates—children, their parents, even their grandparents,
for example, have a stake in a strong public-education
system—and in receiving constituent services . . . . By
ensuring that each representative is subject to requests and
suggestions from the same number of constituents, totalpopulation apportionment promotes equitable and
effective representation. 72
Subsequently, the Court declined to decide if states may
permissibly draw districts to equalize eligible voter population instead of
total population. 73 However, it did note that in some rare circumstances, a
different standard for redistricting may be adopted so long as that standard
is nondiscriminatory. 74 Without explicitly stating what factors might create
these rare situations, the Court held that “‘[e]qual representation for equal
numbers of people is a principle designed to prevent debasement of voting
power and diminution of access to elected representatives.’” 75 This suggests
that it is permissible to draw districts based on a measure other than total
population if the alternative would result in a “debasement” of voting power
for a community. 76

3.

The Davidson v. City of Cranston Decision

In a more recent decision post-Evenwel, the First Circuit came to
the opposite conclusion than in Calvin when confronted with a similar
situation and remarkably similar facts. 77 The City of Cranston has six wards,
one of which was redistricted to include all 3,433 prisoners at the Adult
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 1127.
Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1132.
Id.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1142 (citing Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 75 (1966), wherein Hawaii’s large

military base population created a situation justifying the exclusion of the members of the
armed forces from state redistricting) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1131 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969)).
75
76
77

See id.

Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135, 138–40 (1st Cir. 2016).
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Correctional Institutions (ACI). 78 Subtracting the prisoners from the ward’s
population would have created a roughly thirty-five percent population
deviation from the city’s other wards. 79 Four residents of those wards
complained that this redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause
by diluting their voting power in comparison with the ward containing ACI. 80
For similar reasons as the Calvin court, the district court upheld the
plaintiff’s challenge as:
“[t]he inmates at the ACI share none of the characteristics
of the [historically nonvoting] constituencies [such as
women, children, slaves, taxpaying Indians, and nonlandholding men] described by the Supreme Court” . . . to
deserve representation in apportionment [and that] the
inmates have no interest in Cranston’s public schools,
receive few services from the City, and have no contact with
Cranston’s elected officials. 81
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. 82
Acknowledging that Evenwel did not address the precise question of prison
gerrymandering, the First Circuit nevertheless upheld the redistricting based
on equalized total population, noting the process could only be deemed
discriminatory based on a showing that racial groups have been
disadvantaged. 83 As the court explained, “[t]he more natural reading of
Evenwel is that the use of total population from the Census for
apportionment is the constitutional default, but certain deviations are
permissible, such as the exclusion of non-permanent residents, inmates, or
non-citizen immigrants.” 84
The Calvin/Davidson split highlights the tension created by the
unique position of prisoners in a district’s total population. In the coming
years, the Supreme Court will likely be called upon to decide this unique
and narrow situation.
III.

78
79
80
81
82
83

DISTINGUISHING INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS FROM OTHER
NON-VOTING OR TRANSIENT POPULATIONS

Id.
Id.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 142–43 (“It is true that Evenwel did not decide the precise question before us.

Nevertheless, we hold that its methodology and logic compel us to hold in favor of Cranston.
Evenwel dictates that we look at constitutional history, precedent, and settled practice. Doing
so leads us to find the inclusion of the ACI prisoners in Ward Six constitutionally
permissible.” (internal citations omitted)).
Id. at 144.
84
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Prison populations share similarities with other populations that
have a temporary residence or are non-voting, but the circumstances of their
incarceration warrant different treatment for representation purposes.
Consistent with Evenwel, moving to redistricting based entirely on the total
number of voters is undesirable when it results in a “debasement of voting
power and diminution of access to elected representatives.” 85 Mass
incarceration, working in conjunction with rurally placed prisons, debases
voting power and reduces access to actual representation for the
incarcerated individuals and the communities from which they are
incarcerated. 86 This Part distinguishes prisoners from frequently analogized
populations.

A.

Usual Residence Rule for Group Quarters

To count individuals, the Census Act of 1790 established the “usual
residence” rule, defining residence as the place “where a person lives and
sleeps most of the time.” 87 One of the most substantive challenges facing the
Census Bureau is determining how to count individuals who are living in
temporary group quarters, college students, members of the military, or
incarcerated individuals. In 1950, the Census Bureau explicitly declared that
college students should be counted at their “usual residence,” which was
typically their college location. 88 Since 1970, the Census Bureau has counted
service members serving overseas as residents of their home state, while
counting service members serving at a domestic base as residents of that
military base. 89 Similarly, prisoners have been counted as residents of their
prison’s location, and the Census Bureau recently announced that this
practice would continue for the 2020 Census. 90
Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1131 (2016) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526, 531 (1969)).
See Remster & Kramer, supra note 8, at 4 (stating, “[f]or example, were the U.S. to
prioritize vote equality over representational equality, at least 13 congressional districts would
move from states with large non-voting immigrant populations such as Texas and California
to states with relatively low immigrant populations like Kentucky and Montana. . . .
Hyperincarceration may subtly, but perniciously, violate the constitutional right to equal
representation for all persons.”).
2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/2020-census/about/residencerule.html [https://perma.cc/3EBV-H2Z8].
D’vera Cohn, College Students Count in the Census, but Where?, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar.
15,
2010),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/03/15/college-students-count-in-thecensus-but-where/ [https://perma.cc/9WTE-VF3G].
Richard Sisk, Census to Count Troops by Base Home Address, Officials Say,
MILITARY.COM (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/08/12/censuscount-troops-base-home-address-officials-say.html [https://perma.cc/EEL7-754T].
Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg. 5525 (Feb.
8, 2018), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/02/08/201885

86

87

88

89

90
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The Census count has a substantial impact on a community,
particularly in locations where the atypical “usual residence” situations
apply. College towns, military bases, and prisons can inflate the resident
count, which may impact federal funding eligibility, voting power, and
district shapes during state and local redistricting processes. Former New
Jersey Governor, Chris Christie, cited prisoner’s consumption of
community resources and services as a reason for vetoing a bill that would
have banned prison gerrymandering in 2016. 91
Despite similar treatment by many states, the assumption that the
three groups are “similarly situated” is “questionable at best.” 92 Prisoners are
distinctly different from college students and members of the armed forces
in three critical ways: they do not engage with the community in any
meaningful way; they are unable to politically express themselves or
manifest their political goals; and there is a lack of meaningful choice on
behalf of prisoners in determining their location.

1.

Lack of Community Engagement

Prisoners are distinct from both college students and members of
the armed forces in their ability to engage with their local communities.
Students who are counted at their university address are integral to their
local communities. Businesses are established to cater to their needs.
Students and members of the armed forces work in the community, buy
goods and services in the community, and are otherwise members of the
community like anyone else. 93 Conversely, instead of being capable of
engaging and integrating with local communities for shared benefit,

02370/final-2020-census-residence-criteria-and-residence-situations [https://perma.cc/546PDY8S].
Hurtado, supra note 21. New Jersey has since banned prison gerrymandering after electing
a new governor in 2018. Johnson, supra note 21.
Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 896 (D. Md. 2011), aff'd, 567 U.S. 930 (2012)
(stating, “[w]e also observe that the plaintiffs' argument on this point implies that college
students, soldiers, and prisoners are all similarly situated groups. This assumption, however,
is questionable at best. College students and members of the military are eligible to vote,
while incarcerated persons are not. In addition, college students and military personnel have
the liberty to interact with members of the surrounding community and to engage fully in
civic life. In this sense, both groups have a much more substantial connection to, and effect
on, the communities where they reside than do prisoners.”). But see Rucho v. Common
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
See e.g., Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans, 449 F.2d 575, 579 (3rd Cir. 1971) (focusing on
the importance of students ability to “eat, sleep, and work” in a community); Julie A.
Ebenstein, The Geography of Mass Incarceration: Prison Gerrymandering and the Dilution
of Prisoners’ Political Representation, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323, 368 (2018) (quoting
language from Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 896).
91

92

93
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prisoners are purposefully and intentionally kept apart from the
communities that neighbor the prison. 94
Governor Christie’s argument for retaining prison gerrymandering
was that prisoners consumed resources that communities receive, in part,
based on the Census population results, and it would therefore be unfair to
reduce that funding. 95 However, prisoners cannot utilize resources from any
of the ten largest programs whose funds are guided by Census data. 96 While
the additional money derived from counting prisoners in the location of
their incarceration benefits that community, it does not benefit the prisoners
who are artificially inflating that Census count. 97

2.

Lack of Political Power and Expression

As articulated in Calvin, prisoners lack a “representational nexus”
to their elected officials. 98 In short, representational equity is only met if
prisoners have some sort of connection to their representatives. 99 Unlike
other transitory communities, most incarcerated individuals cannot vote in
the communities in which they purportedly reside. 100 Combined with a lack
of visibility and engagement within the prison’s community, there is little
incentive for elected officials to consider the incarcerated population as
constituents. In Dodge County, Wisconsin, where three large prison
populations comprise a large proportion of the total population, an elected
official said “he doesn’t consider that large demographic when governing.
The prisoners don’t contact him, and he doesn’t reach out to them.” 101 It is
likely a common perspective among elected officials. 102 Indeed, “[w]hen
94
95

Ebenstein, supra note 92.
See Hurtado, supra note 21.

The top ten programs guided by census data are Medicaid, Federal Direct Student Loans,
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Medicare Supplement Insurance (Part B),
Highway Planning and Construction, Federal Pell Grant Program, Section 8 Housing Choice
Vouchers, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Very Low to Moderate Income
Housing Loans, and Title I Grants to Local Education Agencies. Tracy Gordon, The Census
Is About Nearly $1 Trillion in Federal Spending, Not Just Elections, TAX POL’Y CTR. (June
27, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/census-about-nearly-1-trillion-federalspending-not-just-elections [https://perma.cc/9FLG-KCA8].
96

97
98
99

See id.

Calvin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2016).

See id.

Timm, supra note 5.
Tim Damos, In Depth: Feds Won’t Change How Prisoners Counted in 2020, BARABOO
NEWS
REPUBLIC
(Jan.
12,
2019),
https://www.wiscnews.com/baraboonewsrepublic/news/local/govt-and-politics/in-depth-fedswon-t-change-how-prisoners-counted-in/article_1f4f2dbf-5a0f-549e-8766ca928fd437e6.html [https://perma.cc/ZTT7-2JVG].
The nationwide “Visit a Prison Challenge” promoted by Families Against Mandatory
Minimums strongly suggests that it is unusual for elected officials to truly consider prisoners
100
101

102
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polled, legislators view prisoners from their home districts who are
incarcerated elsewhere as their constituency more so than prisoners
incarcerated in their districts who otherwise have no ties there.” 103
Students and members of the armed forces can engage politically
in other ways as well. They can organize advocacy campaigns that include
canvassing, phone banking, letter writing, advertising, attending local
advocacy events, and they can simply knock on their representative’s door
and ask to be heard. Prisoners do not have opportunities to tie themselves
to the representation of the community. 104

3.

Lack of Meaningful Choice in Location

There is precedent for counting populations living in group
quarters from their prior, permanent location instead of their temporary
locations. In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 105 the court addressed the question
of how to appropriately count members of the armed forces stationed
overseas while the Census occurred. Massachusetts lost a congressional seat
after the 1990 Census and brought action against the Census Bureau for
counting overseas soldiers at their “home of record” instead of as residents
of the overseas location. 106 Massachusetts argued that this practice violated
the “usual residence” rule and was unconstitutional in conducting an “actual
Enumeration” as required by the United States Constitution. 107 The Court
rejected this argument unanimously. 108
[Usual residence] can mean more than mere physical
presence, and has been used broadly enough to include
some element of allegiance or enduring tie to a place .
. . .The Act placed no limit on the duration of the absence,

or their needs when governing. FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS,
https://famm.org/visitaprison/ [https://perma.cc/AR4P-8E5A]; see also Stephanie Wykstra,
The Growing Push for Politicians to #VisitAPrison, THE PROGRESSIVE (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://progressive.org/dispatches/growing-push-for-politicians-visit-prison-wykstra-190829/
[https://perma.cc/D24L-QGYN] (“It’s our job. We represent them, too. So whether or not
they’re enfranchised or disenfranchised, we are still their representative, . . . [t]o not pay any
attention, to not come and listen to and speak to such a huge portion of our population in
some of these districts, is egregious and unacceptable.”).
Remster & Kramer, supra note 8, at 421.
Ebenstein, supra note 93, at 369–70 (“Prisons allow for only a limited connection between
people incarcerated and the residents of the community surrounding the prison and few
opportunities to politically engage. By contrast, college students and military personnel can
choose to engage their surrounding communities in civic life.”).
505 U.S. 788 (1992).
Id. at 790–91.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 806.
103
104

105
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which, considering the modes of transportation available at
the time, may have been quite lengthy. 109
Relying on the same logic, counting prisoners as residents of their
communities prior to incarceration “does not hamper the underlying
constitutional goal of equal representation, but, assuming that employees
temporarily stationed abroad have indeed retained their ties to their home
States, actually promotes equality.” 110 Both groups lack a meaningful say in
where they go after leaving their home communities, and likely have
retained ties to those communities.

B.

Non-Voting Populations

A representative democracy includes representation for
individuals who are not able to cast a ballot for a variety of reasons. While
it may seem comical to group minors with undocumented immigrants,
immigrants on a visa, and disenfranchised ex-offenders, all of those
populations, like incarcerated individuals, are unable to vote for their
representation. Evenwel made it clear that redistricting based on total
population without regard for voter population is constitutionally
permissible. 111 However, prisoners can and should be distinguished from
these other non-voting groups. Prisoners “are a unique non-voting
population in terms of representation in that they are moved without their
consent, sequestered from outside interaction, and disconnected from the
local community and official representatives.” 112
The Calvin Court considered other groups of non-voters under
the same “representational nexus” framework that it applied to the
community at large. 113 As is the case for minors who do not wield the ability
to vote, non-voting individuals may still engage with the political process by
speaking out on political issues, organizing in their communities, and
encouraging their representatives to be responsive to their needs. Other
non-voting communities, such as students here on visas, or non-citizen
residents, often live, work, eat, and sleep in the same communities as votereligible populations and have functionally the same opportunities to engage
with and benefit from the communities they live in. Individuals who qualify
for a path to citizenship under the DREAM Act are a paradigmatic example
of the opportunities available to engage with the larger community. 114 Since
Id. at 804. The Court shares an anecdote about President George Washington residing
primarily at the seat of government or travelling instead of at Mount Vernon, yet he was
counted as a resident of Mount Vernon in the Census. Id.
Id. at 806.
See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016).
Remster & Kramer, supra note 8, at 12.
Calvin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2016).
See, e.g., DREAM Act, S. 874, 116th Cong. (2019).

109
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President Trump’s termination of the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals program in 2017, the individuals who qualified (“Dreamers”) could
engage with their political representatives to look after the Dreamers’
needs. 115 If their needs were not met, Dreamers could even organize mass
action such as protests and other political activities. 116 This type of
engagement is simply not possible for prisoners.
Prisoners are distinct from other non-voting and group quarters
populations and should be treated as such in redistricting efforts. However,
despite the recent attention given to prison gerrymandering cases in the
federal court systems, 117 and a potential stand-off between conflicting circuit
law, 118 violations of state constitution claims may prove to be the superior
method of defeating these discriminatory schemes.
IV.

PRISON GERRYMANDERING IN WISCONSIN

Wisconsin’s constitution stipulates when redistricting should
occur. “At its first session after each enumeration made by the authority of
the United States, the legislature shall apportion and district anew the
members of the senate and assembly, according to the number of
inhabitants.” 119 Despite the simplicity of the constitutional requirement, the
Wisconsin Constitution does not define inhabitants or otherwise clarify the
mechanisms of redistricting beyond simply charging the legislature to do it. 120
Despite a dearth of textual constitutional guidance to resolve the complex
issues of who, precisely, is an inhabitant, in 1981, Wisconsin Attorney
General Bronson La Follette (Attorney General) issued an opinion stating
that the term “inhabitants,” as used at the time of adoption, was intended to
be based on all residents regardless of their eligibility to vote. 121 Therefore,
“it would be inappropriate to exclude any institutional population” when
redistricting the legislature. 122 Though the intent of the framers is a powerful

See, e.g., Cheyenne Haslett, Dreamers Protest on Capitol Hill on DACA Deadline Day,
ABC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dreamers-protest-capitol-hilldaca-deadline-day/story?id=53539262 [https://perma.cc/NU7X-Q5ES].
115

116
117
118

See id.
See, e.g., Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 2016).
Compare Davidson, 837 F.3d at 144, with Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1292, Though Calvin

was a district court decision, it would serve as precedent if the Eleventh Circuit took up a
similar case.
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
119
120
121

See id.
See Bronson La Follette, Opinion No. OAG 22-81, 70 Op. Att’y Gen. 80, 88–89 (1981)

[hereinafter Attorney General 1981 Opinion].
Id. at 91.

122
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argument, the Wisconsin legislature and, subsequently, the Wisconsin
courts have interpreted and defined inhabitants consistently. 123
Revisiting the opinion is critical for Wisconsin’s democracy. Since
the Attorney General’s opinion, Wisconsin’s prison population has grown
from under 4,000 in 1980 124 to over 23,000 in 2019, 125 and is projected to
rise to 25,000 by 2021. 126 Put another way, Wisconsin incarcerated 84 out
of every 100,000 residents in 1980 compared to 378 per 100,000 in 2019. 127
This is a sizeable population that is being counted in a different location
than where they have previously resided and to where they presumably will
return.

A.

Attorney General’s 1981 Opinion

The 1981 Attorney General opinion is the only official direct legal
interpretation of “inhabitant.” 128 At the time of its writing, the effect of the
prison population on districts was likely small. 129 The Attorney General’s
opinion relies on three primary arguments. First, the Census counts
prisoners at their incarcerated locations due to the usual residence rule.
Second, the historical usage of “inhabitant” in contemporary statutes
suggests that prisoners are residents of their prisons. Third, several
Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions at the turn of the century determined
the constitutional requirements of redistricting in Wisconsin. 130
123

See infra Section II.B.
Prisoners in 1980, U.S. DEP’T.

OF JUST.: BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (May 1981),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p80.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WH3-YD75].
Corrections at a Glance, WIS. DEP’T OF CORR. (Dec. 2019),
https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/DataAndReports/DAIAtAGlance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SXD9-NTTS].
See Ximena Conde, Report Shows Record Number of Adults in Wisconsin Prisons, WIS.
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.wpr.org/report-shows-record-number-adultswisconsin-prisons [https://perma.cc/G4SV-CR2Z] (projecting a 5.7% increase in 2021 from
the amount of adult prisoners in 2017, which was 23,687).
E. Ann Carson, Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool: Imprisonment Rate of Sentenced
124

125

126

127

Prisoners Under the Jurisdiction of State or Federal Correctional Authorities per 100,000
U.S. Residents, December 31, 1978-2018, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Dec. 9, 2019),

https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps [https://perma.cc/V7BG-7AF8] (for the year 1980); E.
ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2019 11–12 tbl. 7 (Oct. 2020),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p19.pdf [https://perma.cc/T58N-USDJ].
Based on a search of Wisconsin’s Annotated Statutes and Westlaw for Wisconsin state
courts and federal court cases. See Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 88–
89. Compare State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724 (1892), with State ex rel.
Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35 (1892) (both discussing the importance of the census in
the reapportionment process).
See Remster & Kramer, supra note 9, at 9–10 (“Until the 1980s there were so few prisoners
that this policy likely had little impact.”).
See Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 84, 87, 89.
128

129

130
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Usual Residence and “Other Aliens”

The Attorney General placed great stock in the Census practice
of counting individuals at their usual residence. Quoting the Census Bureau:
“These are persons under care or custody at the time of enumeration. They
are persons in . . . correctional institutions. These persons are enumerated
as residents of an institution—regardless of their length of stay in a particular
place.” 131 In support, the Attorney General cited Borough of Bethel Park v.
Stans, 132 where the Third Circuit upheld the Census usual residence practice
for individuals confined to an institution. 133
In Borough of Bethel Park, the city challenged the Census Bureau’s
practice of counting college students, members of the armed forces, and
prisoners as inhabitants of their respective institutions, arguing it was
unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments for the
purposes of congressional reapportionment. 134 The Third Circuit
proceeded to review how the earliest Congress empowered the Census to
determine an individual’s location based on their “usual residency.” 135 In
analyzing how college students, members of the armed forces, and prisoners
have historically been counted, the court rejected the plaintiff’s complaints
by narrowly focusing on the logistical difficulty faced by the Census Bureau
in correctly counting and allocating individuals, and that the Constitution
did not require anything else. 136 “The enormous task which the [Census]
Bureau must complete in enumerating people according to each state can
reasonably necessitate the use of a definite, accurate and verifiable
standard.” 137 However, the court cites to Burns v. Richardson in a footnote, 138
where the court clarifies that its holding is only true for congressional
apportionment, while Burns was focused on state legislative redistricting. 139
The Attorney General also dismissed the distinction between
non-voting incarcerated individuals and the surrounding community by
citing Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, which
held that the U.S. Constitution’s “whole number of persons” requirement
Id. at 84 (quoting U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 20 Decennial Census—1980,
Questionnaire Reference Book (D-561), at 90).

131

th

449 F.2d 575, 578 (3rd Cir. 1971).
See Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120 (including other institutions such as
mental institutions, senior care facilities, and long-term care hospitals).
See Borough of Bethel Park, 449 F.2d at 577.
See id. at 578.
See id. at 581.
Id. at 579.
384 U.S. 73, 92 n.21 (1966).
Borough of Bethel Park, 449 F.2d at 582 n.4 (citing Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 86
(1966)) (“The Court indicated that a state legislature must be apportioned substantially on a
population basis but did not say that a particular population measure was required.”).
132
133

134
135
136
137
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for congressional apportionment includes both “illegal as well as legal
aliens.” 140
Generally, this analysis tracks with federal jurisprudence, as
discussed in Evenwel and Harris. 141 However, the Attorney General’s
analysis makes little mention of Burns, decided fourteen years prior, which
explicitly allowed some form of redistricting based on factors other than
total population. 142 Since Klutznick is a case from the district court of the
District of Columbia, it is non-binding on Wisconsin. For that reason, these
deficits in the Attorney General’s opinion could be corrected, if revisited.

2.

Wisconsin’s Statutory Usage of “Inhabitant”

The Wisconsin Constitution was adopted in 1848 and the
relevant section on reapportionment originally read:
The legislature shall provide by law for an enumeration of
the inhabitants of the state in the year one thousand eight
hundred and fifty-five, and at the end of every ten years
thereafter, and at their first session after such enumeration,
and also after each enumeration made by the authority of
the United States, the legislature shall apportion and
district anew the members of the senate and assembly,
according to the number of inhabitants . . . . 143
This is substantially similar to the revised version that exists today.
At its first session after each enumeration made by the
authority of the United States, the legislature shall
apportion and district anew the members of the senate and
assembly, according to the number of inhabitants. 144
Statutes passed contemporaneously with the Wisconsin
Constitution also use the term “inhabitant,” defining it as “a resident in the
particular locality . . . .” 145 This is consistent with other contemporaneous
laws defining that residents included everyone regardless of whether they
were able to vote. 146 The Attorney General pointed out four sections in the
See Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120 (quoting Fed’n for Am. Immigr.
Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1980)).
See generally supra Section II.E.
See supra text accompanying note 73; Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at
87 n.2.
Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 87 (showing the effective version in
1981 when the Attorney General wrote the opinion is identical to the modern version with
“excluding soldiers, and officers of the United States army and navy” appended to the end).
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 88 (citing 1849 Revised Statutes, Ch.
4, § 1).
See id. at 89 (excluding “certain Indians”).
140

141
142

143

144
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Laws of 1855 that focus on counting residents “within their city, town, or
division,” or “at every dwelling.” 147

3.

Wisconsin Supreme Court Precedent

The Attorney General next argued that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court determined that, due to language specifying reapportionment should
come after the enumeration in the Census, this decennial Census is
“evidently intended as the basis of apportionment.” 148 This language comes
from two 1892 Wisconsin Supreme Court cases on reapportionment. 149 The
Attorney General then continued to discuss equal apportionment and its
interpretation by the state and federal courts. 150 However, only the 1892
cases directly apply to prison gerrymandering. 151

B.

Race and Residency

Where prisoners are counted for representation is more relevant
in Wisconsin due to the overwhelming concentration of minorities in
Milwaukee—Wisconsin’s largest city. 152 Wisconsin also disproportionately
incarcerates Black residents, at a rate of 11.5 times more than white
residents. 153 Though the state as a whole is largely White, rural communities
are experiencing population decline, while the urban counties where Black
residents predominantly live are growing. 154 Counting incarcerated
individuals in the county of incarceration, instead of county of residence,
inflates the residency numbers in shrinking rural counties with large prisons,
147
148
149

Id.
Id. at 90 (quoting State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35 (Wis. 1892)).
See State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. at 35; State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v.

Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724, 738 (Wis. 1892).
Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 91–93.

150
151

See id.

Katherine J. Curtis & Sarah E. Lessem, 2010 Census Chartbook, WIS. APPLIED
POPULATION
LAB
30
(Dec.
2014),
https://cdn.apl.wisc.edu/publications/2010_census_chartbook_wi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/36ZW-JYNG] (“Today, Wisconsin’s African Americans live primarily in
the southeast and in rural counties that have prisons.”).
See, e.g., Mary M. Prosser & Shannon Toole, Wisconsin’s Mass & Disparate
Incarceration,
91
WIS.
LAW.
(Apr. 2018),
https://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=91&I
ssue=4&ArticleID=26275 [https://perma.cc/E7PC-SLNC].
See, e.g., Chris Hubbuch, Census: Dane County Leads State in Population Growth; More
than Double Any Other County in Wisconsin, WIS. ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/census-dane-county-leads-state-inpopulation-growth-more-than/article_3ae7268e-8f02-52e3-a599-8787064dcf60.html
[https://perma.cc/6QCS-UJVX] (reporting and visualizing raw data from the Census
Bureau).
152

153
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distorting overall legislative maps. The true populations of Black
communities in Wisconsin are undercut because the disproportionately
Black prison population contributes instead to the “population” in primarily
White districts.
Though statewide efforts to legislatively change this practice have
failed, some localities in Wisconsin have responded to their incarcerated
populations by splitting out the population among several districts to dilute
the distortional effects. Specifically, pursuant to the Calvin decision, Dodge
County, Wisconsin, has drawn its supervisor districts to split large
correctional facilities among six districts so that voters in one district do not
have disproportionate weight given to their votes. 155 This county-level
solution mirrors solutions pursued elsewhere nationally. 156
V.

WISCONSIN’S CONSTITUTION REQUIRES “RESIDENCY” FOR
REDISTRICTING

By counting incarcerated individuals at their place of incarceration,
Wisconsin is likely violating its own constitutional requirements for
redistricting. The Wisconsin Constitution requires that districts be
reapportioned “according to the number of inhabitants.” 157 The Attorney
General’s opinion is an incorrect reading based on historic Census practice
and convenience, without regard to the distorting effects of such a policy
and the legislative usage of “inhabitants.” 158
As of February 28, 2020, Wisconsin has incarcerated 23,471
individuals. 159 Of these individuals, over 43% are Black, 160 despite comprising
only 6.1% of Wisconsin’s population. 161 Wisconsin’s Black population is
also highly concentrated in six counties in Wisconsin’s southeast. 162
Milwaukee County alone is home to nearly seventy percent of Wisconsin’s
155
156
157
158

See Damos, supra note 101.
See, e.g., Stachulski, supra note 4, at 407.
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3.

Id.
Weekly Population Report for Friday, Feb. 28, 2020, WIS. DEP’T

OF CORR. (2020),
https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/WeeklyPopulationReports/02282020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5XZ-JFAX].
2019 Profile of Persons in Our Care, WIS. DEP’T OF CORR. 2 (July 2020),
https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/DataAndReports/2019%20PIOC%20Profile.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JM75-DM2W].
African Americans in Wisconsin: Overview, WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS. (Sept. 10,
2018),
https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/minority-health/population/afriamer-pop.htm
[https://perma.cc/JNN7-M63G].
Id. (“Nearly 90 percent of Wisconsin's African American population lives in the following
six counties, all of which are located in Southeastern or Southern Wisconsin: Milwaukee,
Dane, Racine, Kenosha, Rock, and Waukesha.”).
159

160

161
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Black population. 163 Without further statistical information from
Wisconsin’s Department of Corrections, a precise match of the
incarcerated population back to their home county is not possible. For
illustrative purposes only, I assume a proportionate distribution of
Wisconsin’s Black prison population from each county. 164 For example,
assuming 70 percent of Wisconsin’s Black prison population comes from
Milwaukee County, that would mean roughly 6,600 Black individuals from
Milwaukee County are currently being counted externally in other
counties. 165

A.

Legislative Definition

The Wisconsin Constitution requires that districts are
reapportioned “according to the number of inhabitants.” 166 The Attorney
General’s opinion on how the constitution interprets “inhabitant”
contradicts decades of Wisconsin’s statutory interpretation of “inhabitants.”
The Wisconsin Legislature has weighed in on how to define “inhabitants”
in other contexts. Wisconsin’s Constitution requires apportionment based
on all inhabitants. 167 Wisconsin law regarding statutory construction defines
“inhabitant” to mean “resident.” 168 Throughout the statutes, residence is
defined six separate times as the “voluntary concurrence of physical
presence with intent to remain in a place of fixed habitation . . . .” 169 This
definition predates Attorney General La Follette’s 1981 opinion, but he
makes no reference to the Legislature’s consistent interpretation in insisting
upon a different definition of “inhabitant” for this specific clause in the
constitution. 170
Subsequently, the Wisconsin Legislature has continued to support
the interpretation that prisoners are not residents—and therefore, not
inhabitants—of the prisons where they are incarcerated. In Chapter 51 of
163

Id.

This is a rough approximation to help illustrate the argument in the absence of proper
statistical demographic information. Determining the true extent of prison gerrymandering
in Wisconsin requires further analysis.
For a more thorough statistical analysis of Pennsylvania, which considers the precise issue
this Note addresses, see Remster & Kramer, supra note 9.
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
164

165

166
167

Id.

WIS. STAT. § 990.01(15) (2019) (noting this definition predates Attorney-General La
Follette’s opinion and the Legislature’s online statutory history does not have a scanned copy
of its enactment. As noted in the Attorney-General’s opinion, the 1849 Revised Statutes
define inhabitant as a resident, as well).
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 980.105(1m)(a) (2019); 49.001(6); 46.27(1)(d); 46.272(1)(e);
55.01(6t); 252.16(1)(e).
The phrase “voluntary concurrence of physical presence with intent to remain” has existed
in statute since at least 1959. See WIS. STAT. § 49.10(12)(c) (1959).
168

169

170
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the Wisconsin Statutes, established in 1987, an individual who is in a state
facility—which includes incarcerated individuals in a state prison as
established in section 302.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes—is a resident of the
county in which they were a resident at the time the admission the state
facility was made. 171 Also supporting the interpretation that incarcerated
individuals are not residents of the prison is section 6.10(1) of the
Wisconsin Statutes, which states that residency is the place where the
person’s habitation is fixed and, “when absent, the person intends to
return.” 172 Section 51.40(2)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes directly addresses
how to determine county of residence for individuals admitted to a state
prison, and this interpretation is supported by section 6.10(1) of the
Wisconsin Statutes which provides for temporary absenteeism.
Wisconsin statutes defining “residence” closely comports with the
federal definition of domicile as interpreted by federal circuit courts. 173 In a
variety of contexts, federal courts have held an individual does not change
residence to the prison’s location simply because they are incarcerated
there. 174 As the Sixth Circuit noted, “[t]he rule shields an unwilling sojourner
from the loss of rights and privileges incident to his citizenship in a particular
place, such as, for example, paying resident tuition at a local university,
invoking the jurisdiction of the local divorce courts, or voting in local
elections.” 175
It is unlikely that an incarcerated individual would intend to remain
in the community that incarcerated them and, without such a showing, it is
unlikely that the individual has changed their domicile as defined by the
federal courts and the Wisconsin Legislature. It seems unlikely that the
Legislature would have chosen a word that has a key place in the state
constitution, defined it consistently as it has been defined since the 1840s,
and still intend for the constitutional version to mean something different.
WIS. STAT. § 51.40(2)(b)(1) (2019).
WIS. STAT. § 6.10(1) (2019).
See Denlinger v. Brennan, 87 F.3d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that domicile is a
voluntary status and a forcible change of residence does not alter domicile); Stifel v. Hopkins,
477 F.2d 1116, 1121 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that prisoners may acquire a domicile in their
incarcerated community only by express showing of intent to remain); Ellingburg v. Connett,
457 F.2d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that one does not change residence by virtue of
incarceration and residence for venue purposes must be determined by facts); Cohen v.
United States, 297 F.2d 760, 774 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating a prisoner’s pre-incarcerated
residence is more appropriate than a temporary prison resident for giving of notice); United
States v. Stabler, 169 F.2d 995, 998 (3d Cir. 1948) (holding that both residence and domicile
require some individual choice and that domicile cannot be acquired while in prison);
Neuberger v. United States, 13 F.2d 541, 543 (2nd Cir. 1926) (“. . . his residence, once
established, was not lost by his enforced absence . . .”).
African Americans in Wisconsin: Overview, supra note 160.
Stifel, 477 F.2d at 1121.
171
172
173

174
175
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Wisconsin Supreme Court Precedent

The Attorney General’s argument rests on two cases decided
within months of each other in 1892, each devoting a single line for how
“inhabitant” was intended to be used. 176 Each case is primarily about
gerrymandering and the concerns the court has for districts that are wildly
disproportionate to others. 177
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham is the first of the
two cases dealing with gerrymandering cited by the Attorney General. In it,
the attorney general at the time asked the court to invalidate the legislature’s
recently passed redistricting plan which had apportioned some districts
without regard to local government borders nor to the population in each
district. 178 The court rejected the reapportionment plan as
unconstitutional. 179 In relevant part:
If, as in this case, there is such a wide and bold departure
from this constitutional rule [of equal districts] that it

cannot possibly be justified by the exercise of any judgment
or discretion, and that evinces an intention on the part of

the legislature to utterly ignore and disregard the rule of the
constitution in order to promote some other object than a
constitutional apportionment, then the conclusion is
inevitable that the legislature did not use any judgment or
discretion whatever. 180
This holding binds the legislature to adhere to constitutional rules
of equalized total population in districts, but implicitly allows for the
legislature to justify departures in the exercise of “judgment or discretion”
which the Attorney General fails to acknowledge in his opinion. 181
The second case, State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, was brought
after the 1892 legislature had reconvened and passed a new redistricting
plan that also had greatly uneven districts because the legislature did not
split counties or other local units of government. 182 Again, the court
determined the plan to be unconstitutional and that apportionment
“according to the number of inhabitants” requires an approximate
equalization of people in each district. 183 The holding in Lamb concerns a
State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35, 54 (Wis. 1892); State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v.
Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724, 738 (Wis. 1892) (Pinney, J., concurring).
State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. at 59; State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Cunningham,
51 N.W. at 738.
State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. at 725.
Id. at 730.
Id. (emphasis added).
176

177

178
179
180
181
182
183

Id.
State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. at 35.
Id. at 59.
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very large disparity in total population between districts, and goes to
ensuring that districts are roughly equal and follow both county and local
government lines as practicably as possible. 184 The Attorney General
emphasizes that the apportionment is to be “‘according to the number of
inhabitants’. . . and the enumeration is evidently intended as the basis of
apportionment.” 185
However, the Attorney General does not distinguish between using
the enumeration as the “basis of apportionment” or the “judgment or
discretion” of the legislature as specified in the Attorney General 1981
Opinion. 186 Each case was decided by the same group of judges in the same
year, with similar issues leading up to the eventual decision. 187 It is unlikely
that legislative discretion would be suitable for reasonable, minor deviations
from total population equality among districts, and then change so quickly
without being explicitly addressed. A more natural reading is that the
districts must be practically equalized in population to avoid a situation like
Baker v. Carr where populations among districts radically varied, while still
allowing some discretion to the legislature to use their judgment. 188
From these decisions, the Attorney General determined that total
population, “according to the federal decennial census, must be used for
legislative redistricting purposes.” 189 This conclusion is unsupported when
considered in light of other Wisconsin constitutional jurisprudence.

C.

Wisconsin’s Equal Protection Clause

Though Wisconsin’s Constitution does not contain the exact
language from the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, the state has
long considered an article of its own constitution as a “substantially
equivalent limitation.” 190 As the Fourteenth Amendment’s jurisprudence
developed, Wisconsin courts formally tied their own jurisprudence for
Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution to the federal Fourteenth
Amendment. 191

Id.
See Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 90 (emphasis in original).
State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. at 738.
See State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35; State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v.
Cunningham, 51 N.W. 274.
See supra Section II.A for a discussion of Baker v. Carr.
Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 91.

184
185
186
187

188
189

Kellogg v. Currens, 87 N.W. 561, 562 (1901) (stating that WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1 is a
substantially similar limitation to the Fourteenth Amendment).
See Reginald D. v. State, 533 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Wis. 1995) (“‘[T]here is no substantial
difference’ between its equal protection and due process protections and that of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
190

191
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Given the open question as to whether prison gerrymandering
could constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, it seems likely
that the Attorney General’s conclusion that Wisconsin’s Constitution
requires something more is erroneous. This Note encourages Wisconsin to
revisit the 1981 opinion.
VI.

EQUAL PROTECTIONS CLAUSE REQUIRES
BLACK VOTES HAVE EQUAL IMPACT

The Supreme Court has made it clear that gerrymandering is
constitutionally permissible unless it is specifically prohibited. 192 More
recently, the Court upheld districts drawn without consideration for the
equalization of eligible voter population. 193 Given the current state of the law
post-Evenwel, it is likely that prison-based gerrymandering is facially
permissible on a federal level. However, the Evenwel Court noted that in
areas with large numbers of temporary residents, eligible voter population,
instead of total population, may be the appropriate standard for
constitutionally permissible districts. 194
Despite the unlikelihood of a facial challenge being successful,
there may be some unusual situations where the facially-permissible prison
gerrymandering results in an impermissible gerrymander, such as one based
on race. Challenging the process as discriminatory may prove to be more
successful in Wisconsin. The state’s demographic, geographic, and
incarceration practices result in primarily Black individuals from primarily
Black counties to be counted in primarily White counties far from their
actual homes, but these individuals are neither allowed to vote in these
counties nor meaningfully connect with them.
The standards set forth in Calvin would serve as a good starting
point for any potential legal challenge to a state’s prison gerrymandering
process. Specifically, a state that could show their prisoners “comprise a (1)
large number of (2) nonvoters who (3) lack a meaningful representational
nexus with the[ir] [representatives], and . . . [are] (4) packed into a small
subset of legislative districts.” 195 Wisconsin’s profile may be a good
opportunity to see whether the Seventh Circuit will follow Calvin or
Davidson, or otherwise chart its own path.
VII.

192
193
194
195

WHAT’S NEXT?

Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966).
Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016).
Id. at 1124 (citing Burns, 384 U.S. at 73).
Calvin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1315 (N.D. Fla. 2016).
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Any change is likely to prove contentious. Despite consistent polls
showing that seventy percent of Wisconsinites would prefer a less partisan
process for redistricting, 196 the Republican-controlled Legislature has
rejected attempts to de-politicize the process. 197 Wisconsin is currently under
a divided government, 198 and it seems likely that whatever redistricting plan
is put into place will end up before the state’s Supreme Court once again.
While it is likely inevitable that other partisan disputes will result in
a lawsuit, the state can rectify a long history of miscounting its prison
population by passing a reform such as the one recently passed in New
Jersey. 199 The data collection is not onerous. New Jersey law requires its
Department of Corrections to keep a database of the last known residence
for each person within their system that can then be used during redistricting
to ensure an accurate count. 200 Wisconsin’s Department of Corrections
likely already keeps this information or, if it does not, could collect it going
forward. In fact, a group of legislators introduced Assembly Bill 400 in the
2020 session. It is simpler than New Jersey’s law in that it does not specify
how the prisoner’s information is to be collected, granting the governor and
legislature further discretion in developing those processes. 201
However, it is not easy to divorce prison gerrymandering from its
typical partisan nature, so the likelihood of such a proposal passing a
Republican-controlled Legislature is reduced. A study of prison
gerrymandering in Pennsylvania “suggest[s] that incarceration, like the
Charles Franklin, New Marquette Law School Poll Finds Sanders’ Support Rising Among
Democrats and Tight Races Between Trump and Each Democratic Candidate for President,

196

MARQUETTE L. SCH. POLL (Feb. 27, 2020), https://law.marquette.edu/poll/2020/02/27/newmarquette-law-school-poll-finds-sanders-support-rising-among-democrats-and-tight-racesbetween-trump-and-each-democratic-candidate-for-president/
[https://perma.cc/J7TLQKGY] (“Voters favor a non-partisan approach to redistricting over the current process in
which the legislature and governor are responsible for drawing legislative and congressional
districts.”).
Scott Bauer, Wisconsin Republicans Dismiss Nonpartisan Redistricting Plan, AP NEWS
(Jan.
23,
2020),
https://apnews.com/86670cf694caeffb440433abb2b8fed5
[https://perma.cc/VDS9-3ULF] (“Democrats have tried in vain to have the Legislature
change the redistricting process and create a nonpartisan commission. . . . Republicans have
rejected past attempts to amend the constitution to create a nonpartisan redistricting
process.”).
Laurel White & Shawn Johnson, State Legislature Convenes New Session with Divided
Government, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 7, 2019, 5:20 PM), https://www.wpr.org/statelegislature-convenes-new-session-divided-government [https://perma.cc/72UY-8ZE3].
Brent Johnson & Matt Arco, N.J. Will Soon Allow You to Register to Vote Online,
NJ.COM (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.nj.com/politics/2020/01/nj-will-soon-allow-you-toregister-to-vote-online.html [https://perma.cc/C4RT-TKQN] (“The new law (S589) requires
the Garden State’s secretary of state to create and maintain a secure website to allow eligible
voters to register to vote using an online form.”).
S. Doc. No. 758, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018).
Assemb. B. 400, 2019–2020 Leg. (Wis. 2019).
197
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199

200
201

508

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

urban/rural divide in voter preference, buttresses Republican advantages
even without partisan gerrymandering. The results . . . indicate that
incarceration leads to an overrepresentation of non-urban voters in
democratic processes via rural vote inflation due to prison location.” 202
In the absence of legislation, Wisconsin’s governor, as the head
of the executive branch, could consider directing the Department of
Corrections to collect information regarding prior residence. Once the data
is collected, the governor could give it to the legislature to use as they see fit
in the redistricting process. While this is not a true “solution” to prison
gerrymandering, the information would put pressure on the legislature to
incorporate the data in the redistricting process or pay a potential political
price for actively ignoring the information. In the absence of legislation
prohibiting the practice, public pressure and an awareness campaign would
center the entire redistricting conversation around fair representation.
The governor could also ask the Department of Corrections, or a
different state agency, to conduct a study of the impact banning prison
gerrymandering might have on Wisconsin. Wisconsin deserves a
comprehensive study to determine which districts’ power has been unfairly
inflated by prison gerrymandering and which has been reduced. This is a
critical first step to drafting fair districts going into the 2021 redistricting cycle
and beyond.
Finally, the governor should ask the attorney general to revisit the
Attorney General 1981 Opinion and reconsider it in light of forty years of
additional case law and a growing prison population whose current
residence does not meet the definition of inhabitance as used by the
Wisconsin legislature. Such opinions may not bind courts to the Attorney
General’s interpretation but can be persuasive nonetheless. 203
A governor-initiated proposal would also align neatly with
Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers’ non-partisan People’s Maps
Commission 204 that would place public pressure on the legislature to adopt
redistricting maps more fairly representative of Wisconsin. 205
Remster & Kramer, supra note 9, at 22–23 (internal citation omitted).
AG Opinions: What is an AG Opinion?, WIS. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/opinions/ag-opinions
[https://perma.cc/Q6RA-5LYC]
(“Wisconsin courts do not have any obligation to follow an interpretation provided by an
[Opinion of the Attorney General], but they often do. As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
has written, ‘Well-reasoned attorney general’s opinions have persuasive value when a court
later addresses the meaning of the same statute.’”).
For more information on the People’s Maps Commission, see THE PEOPLE’S MAPS
COMMISSION, https://govstatus.egov.com/peoplesmaps [https://perma.cc/FM75-FY7B].
Laurel White, Gov. Tony Evers Orders Creation of Nonpartisan Redistricting
Commission, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 27, 2020, 11:05 AM), https://www.wpr.org/gov-tonyevers-orders-creation-nonpartisan-redistricting-commission [https://perma.cc/VEJ7-6NZ5]
(“‘When 80 percent of our state supports medical marijuana, and 80 percent of our state
202
203

204

205
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CONCLUSION

Prison gerrymandering is a policy issue with grave civil rights
concerns. Unlike college students or members of the military, incarcerated
individuals do not make use of local services, are ineligible to vote for their
local representation, and are otherwise isolated from the community to
which they only contribute a statistical body count.
[I]ncarceration and American concepts of equal
representation combine to create “phantom constituents”
and racially unequal political representation. The
incarcerated are not only missing from their communities,
they are also advantaging other communities. 206
In an era of mass incarceration, the injustice perpetuated by prison
gerrymandering will continue to compound. To paraphrase the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision relied upon by Attorney General La Follette,
simply because previous redistricting plans have violated the constitution,
the redistricting plan of 2021 may not do so with impunity. 207 Wisconsin
must act now to avoid continuing a century and a half of mistakes.

supports universal background checks, and also (extreme) risk protection orders, (and) 70
percent want Medicaid expansion, and elected officials can ignore those numbers and say,
“Go jump in a lake,” something’s wrong,’ Evers said.”).
Remster & Kramer, supra note 9, at 26.
State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35, 63 (Wis. 1892) (“I am not claiming that
because previous legislatures have violated the constitution the legislature of 1892 may do so
with impunity.”).
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